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Democracy Promotion and Civilian Power
The Example of Germany's 'Value-Oriented' Foreign Policy

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While Germany is generally considered one of the most important democracy promoters, there is still limited work on the German approach to promoting democracy. There is a general understanding that Germany – as a Civilian Power – should be guided by democratic values in its external affairs, but neither theoretically nor empirically it is very clear what this means for the actual practice of democracy promotion. The present paper contributes to filling this gap by (1) locating democracy promotion as a foreign-policy aim and instrument in the concept of Civilian Power, (2) summarising the fragmented state of the art on German democracy promotion, (3) presenting results of a qualitative content analysis in order to reconstruct the main features of the official outline of German democracy promotion, and (4) confronting these programmatic findings with a brief comparative view on the practice of German democracy promotion towards Bolivia, Turkey and Russia.

1. Introduction

The foreign policy of states is shaped by a series of most different factors.¹ According to an extensive scholarship generally based on some kind of constructivist reasoning, the particular socio-cultural domestic context is one crucial determinant, whether it is conceptualised in terms of national role conceptions,² national identities,³ or, more general, political culture.⁴ When it comes to Germany, the concept of Civilian Power, devised by Hanns W. Maull, is the most prominent attempt to grasp the specific features that characterise German foreign policy culture.⁵ From this perspective, German foreign policy aims at actively ‘civilising’ international relations by trying ‘to replace the military enforcement of rules (politics based on power) with the internationalization of socially accepted norms (politics based on legitimacy)’.⁶

Whether applying the specific concept of Civilian Power or not, other scholars working on German foreign and security policies have largely confirmed the general argument.⁷ Although the evolution of German foreign policy since 1990 in general – and German participation in the Kosovo War in 1999 in particular – provoked a debate on whether Germany was gradually abandoning its ‘civilian’ foreign policy culture,⁸ most observers see “‘modified continuity’ rather than fundamental change’.⁹ Some crucial changes with regard to foreign policy *means* (like the use of military force) coexist with a basic continuity in Germany’s foreign policy *aims*.¹⁰ According to the mainstream view, both continuity and change in German foreign policy do not point to a departure *from* but to adjustments *within* the basic culture of a Civilian Power.¹¹

Broad consensus has it that, since the end of the Cold War, democracy promotion has become an important aim and strategy of the foreign and development policies of most democratic states, including Germany.¹² Yet, up to now, democracy promotion scholarship has largely focused on the United States and the European Union. There is, therefore, limited work on the German approach to democracy promotion (including on the question whether there is indeed

a specific one). Likewise, the literature on (Germany as a) Civilian Power has hardly dealt with democracy promotion. The present paper contributes to filling this gap by doing four things. In a first conceptual step, democracy promotion as a foreign-policy aim and instrument is theoretically located in the concept of Civilian Power. Second, the paper summarises the fragmented state of the art on German democracy promotion in order to see whether empirical observations confirm theoretical expectations. Third, results of a qualitative content analysis are presented in order to reconstruct the main features of the official outline of German democracy promotion. Fourth, these programmatic findings are confronted with a brief comparative view on the practice of German democracy promotion towards three different cases, namely Bolivia, Turkey and Russia.¹³

2. ‘Civilian’ democracy promotion: Conceptual issues and ambivalent expectations

In the academic writings on Civilian Power, references to values, norms and rights abound. Yet, the proper place and shape of democracy promotion – understood as all those measures taken by an external actor that are explicitly ‘aimed at establishing, strengthening, or defending democracy in a given country’¹⁴ – in the foreign (and development) policies of an ideal-type Civilian Power are far from clear-cut. According to Kirste and Maull, Civilian Powers do not rule out ‘the meddling in the internal affairs of other states’, and the promotion of good governance and democratization is even considered an ‘avowed aim’.¹⁵ Democracy promotion is, however, not among a Civilian Power’s guiding principles. The latter include constraining the use of force in handling political conflicts; strengthening international law, international norms and international regimes; intensifying multilateral cooperation with inclusive participation and a partial transfer of sovereignty; and promoting social justice at the global level.¹⁶ The problem, now, is that democracy promotion is not just an additional aim which can be considered as complimentary (if secondary) to the guiding principles mentioned. In a world that is not only made up of democracies, an active ‘meddling in the internal affairs of other states’ in order to promote the democratization of non-democratic regimes clashes both with the respect for the norm of collective self-determination and sovereignty as well as with the aims to establish mutual trust and maintain international peace by cooperating with all real-existing states in an inclusive international order.¹⁷ To the extent that there is a ‘tension inherent in the Civilian Power concept, pertaining to the question of whether the pursuit of peace or the defence of democratic rights should take priority’,¹⁸ there can be no doubt that a Civilian Power should be expected to privilege the former.

This is not to say that a Civilian Power will not promote democracy but, given the priorities assumed by the literature,¹⁹ it will be only reluctantly do so and focus on accompanying ongoing processes of democratization, establishing positive incentives, and relying on collective, multilateral means. The prime interest is in using international cooperation as a means of civilising world politics which implies both the inclusion of non-democratic regimes and the rejection of unilateral action. A Civilian Power's 'value-oriented foreign policy'²⁰ will less focus on explicitly promoting democracy as a particular (and contested) type of political rule but more on supporting human rights in a rather broad notion of 'universal values'.²¹

In a recent piece, Thomas Carothers has identified 'two distinct overall approaches to assisting democracy: the *political* approach and the *development* approach'. The former is characterised by 'a relatively narrow conception of democracy – focused, above all, on elections and political liberties – and a view of democratization as a process of political struggle in which democrats work to gain the upper hand in society over nondemocrats'; democracy assistance, here, is directed 'at core political processes and institutions [...] often at important conjunctural moments and with the hope of catalytic effects'. The developmental approach, by contrast, quite nicely fits the expectations for a Civilian Power. It 'rests on a broader notion of democracy, one that encompasses concerns about equality and justice and the concept of democratization as a low, iterative process of change involving an interrelated set of political and socioeconomic developments' while favouring 'democracy aid that pursues incremental, long-term change in a wide range of political and socioeconomic sectors, frequently emphasizing governance and the building of a well-functioning state'.²² A broad notion of democracy fits much better with human rights as established at the international level (which are not narrowly defined in liberal terms, but include civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights). A gradual, evolutionary and complex conception of democratization corresponds to the whole notion of 'civilising' international relations which draws on Norbert Elias' sociological analysis of the civilising process – the century-long, non-linear process of pacifying European societies.²³

In this sense, an ideal-type conception of democracy promotion by a Civilian Power can be characterised by the following four features: It would (1) be based on a rather abstract and broad notion of universal values and rights; (2) conceive of democratization as a long-term, evolutionary process of complex transformation; (3) privilege pragmatic strategies of (institutional) cooperation and inclusion; and (4) be relatively reluctant to openly meddle in other states' affairs and infringe on their rights to sovereignty and self-determination.²⁴

3. German democracy promotion: The fragmented state of the art

In line with the Civilian Power concept, German governments regularly characterise their foreign (and development) policies as ‘value-oriented’. Usually, however, it is not very clear to what extent this value-orientation includes an explicit focus on democracy promotion.

In general, Germany has been portrayed as a reluctant – late-coming and selective – democracy promoter.²⁵ Before 1990, German democracy promotion was mainly the business of the political party foundations.²⁶ Development aid at that time ‘pursued a rather apolitical, technical approach’ and, on the macro level, aimed ‘at keeping developing countries in the western camp’.²⁷ Likewise, ‘human rights rhetoric in German foreign policy was mainly used as an instrument in the ideological conflict with the Soviet Union and the GDR’.²⁸ It was the ‘third wave of democratization’²⁹ and, in particular, the end of the Cold War that ‘changed the parameters of Germany’s approach to democracy promotion’.³⁰ Since 1990, German governments have increasingly emphasised human rights as an important guideline for their foreign and development policies. In 1991, the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development introduced political conditionalities related to human rights, the rule of law and political participation. These conditions, however, were rather soft criteria for evaluating partner countries than hard preconditions.³¹ The Foreign Office, in 1992, created a democracy promotion facility which focused on funding election observer missions.³² In the course of the 1990s, the GTZ – the agency (now GIZ) implementing Germany’s official technical cooperation – adopted an increasingly political democracy and governance assistance as part of German development cooperation.³³

More than other ‘donors’, the German government has been emphasising that democratization ‘should not be limited to holding more or less free elections’ but requires broader attention to human rights, the *Rechtsstaat* (rule of law) and civil society.³⁴ As the Civilian Power approach would expect, discourse and practice of German democracy promotion in the 1990s are described as rather reluctant as to the political meddling in internal affairs of other states: German democracy assistance activities have been focusing on good governance, the rule of law, decentralization and administration; the Foreign Office, if it considered democracy promotion at all, viewed it as part of its broader human rights policies.³⁵ In 1996, Gero Erdmann concluded that the Development Ministry preferred to talk about human rights and not democracy promotion, while the Foreign Office largely limited democracy promotion to selective activities of technical electoral support.³⁶ In official rhetoric both the Foreign Office and the Development Ministry emphasised that they were guided – in line with United

Nations' norms – by a broad notion of human rights comprising both the civil-political and the social, economic and cultural rights, even if with an implicit preference for the former.³⁷

This reluctance vis-à-vis an openly political approach to promoting democracy is well in line with the expectations for a Civilian Power.³⁸ The same holds true for the German focus on positive capacity-building activities, i.e. on democracy assistance.³⁹ In terms of political conditionalities, Germany has been prioritising a rather 'soft conditionality' while preferring dialogue, incentives and long-term strategies of taking influence; coercive measures have been (and are) the exception.⁴⁰ Negative sanctions as a means to promote (or protect) democracy were – and are – used only 'very selectively, occasionally half-heartedly, inconsistently, and situationally'.⁴¹ This cautious and selective use of sanctions has traditionally been justified by an evolutionary, modernisation-theory argument: The support for economic growth and reforms – e.g., in China – was supposed to lead to political reforms in the middle to long run.⁴²

According to Lapins, German democracy promotion is 'long-term in conception', 'not missionary' but 'as a policy of the good example'.⁴³ The Foreign Office, in particular, prefers indirect measures, above all to avoid confrontation and the charge of interfering in other states' internal affairs.⁴⁴ Well in line with the ambivalent expectations outlined in Section 2, German human rights policy was far more consistent in strengthening international human rights norms within the United Nations than in terms of reacting to human rights violations in other countries.⁴⁵ Nicely summarising German preferences, the coalition agreement between Christian Democrats and Social Democrats in 2005 highlighted 'bilateral dialogues about the rule of law [*Rechtsstaatsdialoge*], measures to strengthen civil society, and democracy promotion in the multilateral framework'.⁴⁶ The role of the German political foundations – that are still important actors in implementing German democracy assistance – adds to this because their work has traditionally aimed at promoting dialogue, education and inclusive exchange with a view to enabling long-term processes of political development.⁴⁷

These features characterising German democracy promotion since 1990 correspond not only to the culturally embedded profile of a Civilian Power, but also to the material interests of a heavily export-oriented middle power.⁴⁸ Germany's cautious approach to democracy promotion quite obviously responds to economic considerations related to German trade and investment; political pressure and economic sanctions are regularly rejected when – as with China and Russia – such economic interests are threatened.⁴⁹ In this sense, to the extent that the German conception of democracy promotion corresponds to the notion of a Civilian Power, this does not mean that Germany's political culture does prevail over tangible

‘national interests’. At least with a view to the general pattern of German democracy promotion, cultural predispositions and hegemonic discourses, on the one hand, and material interests, on the other, seem to reinforce each other. In specific situations, however, both may clash – and case studies, here, will have to show the extent to which ‘culture’ shapes policies even when in conflict with perceived tangible interests (see Section 5).

4. German democracy promotion in official rhetoric: Results of a content analysis

The content analysis presented here systematically screened a selection of 20 primary sources (documents and speeches issued by the German government) dealing both with the general guidelines of German foreign, defence and development policy and with German democracy promotion policies in particular.⁵⁰ The aim was to see whether the German conception of democracy promotion as outlined in official rhetoric confirms the four specific expectations for the democracy promotion profile of a Civilian Power (see Section 2).

(1) The results show that in German documents, in fact, references to rather abstract and broad universal values and rights predominate. 13 text passages were coded accordingly (representing 7 per cent of all codes). Examples include references to ‘human dignity’,⁵¹ ‘the democratic values and basic principles’⁵² or human rights in general.⁵³ The Development Ministry explicitly emphasises that Germany does ‘not promote a particular form of democracy’, ‘but the implementation of democratic and rule-of-law principles’.⁵⁴ Only two references were coded as declaring the universality of democracy. In one instance, the BMZ quotes then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan who called democracy a ‘universal right’ – but the Ministry refrains from explicitly embracing this notion.⁵⁵ Just as expectations for a Civilian Power would have it, the German government, thus, does not unilaterally proclaim a universal right to democracy but takes international norms – as represented by the UN Secretary-General – as the point of departure for conceiving its democracy promotion agenda. In the second text passage coded as ‘democracy universal’, the Defence Ministry emphasises freedom, law and human dignity as the universally binding core of human rights.⁵⁶ This combination of concepts can be interpreted as an indirect, if substantial reference to democracy. Yet again, it is notable that democracy as such is not mentioned.⁵⁷

Generally, German rhetoric is characterised by a close relation between democracy and the *Rechtsstaat* (rule of law) which are often mentioned together.⁵⁸ The normative principles that are said as guiding German foreign policy include democratic values and human dignity as well broadly understood (political, civil, economic, social and cultural) human rights – frequently with a reference to internationally codified norms.⁵⁹

(2) In terms of the conception of democratization, the German documents include not a single reference to short-term transitions to democracy, revolutionary processes of change, or ‘democratic breakthroughs’.⁶⁰ Democratization is consistently characterised as a long-term process of gradual change that has to grow from within the respective society. According to the BMZ, democratization encompasses ‘long-term structural changes that establish better preconditions so that projects and reforms in traditional sectors are viable and sustainable’.⁶¹ These are ‘protracted processes’ where setbacks are always possible.⁶² Explicitly turning away from the Transition Paradigm,⁶³ the Development Ministry’s democracy promotion strategy does not mention the transition to democracy as a relevant phase of democratization (or a noteworthy aim of democracy promotion), but speaks about ‘hybrid’ regimes only.⁶⁴

(3) The preference for cooperation and inclusion (instead of confrontation and exclusion) was analyzed with a view to the stance towards non-democratic actors. In comparison to US rhetoric, German documents relatively rarely characterise non-democratic countries or groups as ‘enemies’ and comparatively rarely argue in favour of their exclusion or marginalisation.⁶⁵ Still, it is surprising that Germany advocates ‘exclusion’ more frequently than ‘inclusion’. This, however, is almost entirely due to references to terrorism.⁶⁶ When dealing with terrorists, Germany does adopt a non-inclusionary approach. In and of itself, this is not a contrast to the Civilian Power approach. As Peter Katzenstein has demonstrated, the German approach to counterterrorism is about actively combating global terrorism but sees this largely as a fight against crime – not as a war as the US would have it.⁶⁷

If text passages related to terrorism are taken out, inclusion is clearly the predominant strategy. Exclusion is at best the very last option.⁶⁸ Confronted with ‘countries in which the government impedes or hinders the democratic will-formation by taking arbitrary measures (violating human rights, freedom of opinion etc.)’, the Development Ministry provides for a policy dialogue in order to push the corresponding government ‘to open or broaden the room for a socio-political reform discussion’.⁶⁹ As long as authoritarian ‘partner governments’ refuse to liberalise politically, official German democracy promotion as implemented by the government is to be narrowed down to indirect measures: It ‘takes the existing order [in the partner country] as a starting point and, for the time being, accepts the given correlations of power’; it is to work with a ‘long-term’ orientation aiming at a ‘improvements in governance and administration’, a ‘professionalization of the political system and the rule of law’.⁷⁰ The politically sensitive and potentially confrontational direct support for processes of political reform and liberalisation is, under such conditions, ‘first and foremost the business of non-state actors’.⁷¹ In general, the official principles guiding German democracy promotion –

‘dialogue’, ‘long-term commitment’ and ‘mutual trust’ based ‘on shared value orientations’ – are entirely focused on cooperation.⁷²

(4) The German reluctance to openly speak democracy promotion – noted in Section 3 – is confirmed by the general observation that in general relatively few text passages were coded in the German documents. The whole topic – democracy, democratization, democracy promotion – is far less present in German official rhetoric than, e.g., in the US case.⁷³ More specifically, a frequency analysis for the use of the terms ‘freedom/liberty’, ‘democracy’ and ‘rule of law’ (*Rechtsstaat*) revealed that the US governments mention ‘freedom/liberty’ three times as much as German governments, ‘democracy’ twice as much, and ‘rule of law’ almost equally.⁷⁴ Correspondingly, German documents frequently avoid talking about democracy (promotion) as an aim by relying on indirect references that somehow imply democracy.⁷⁵ If democracy (promotion) is explicitly mentioned, it is usually embedded in a broader context of societal development and a correspondingly general development agenda.⁷⁶ Conceptual vagueness is further aggravated as documents frequently refer to series of not really delineated principles and aims: ‘freedom’, ‘law’ and ‘human dignity’⁷⁷ or ‘empowerment, participation and non-discrimination as well as transparency and accountability’.⁷⁸ Typical for Germany’s cautious approach to democracy promotion is that not only ‘direct’ but also ‘indirect’ strategies are included in the democracy promotion strategy. Such indirect democracy promotion aims at contributing to the ‘output legitimization’ or the ‘performance’ of the state⁷⁹ and is seen as particularly appropriate when dealing with authoritarian states that refuse to liberalise.⁸⁰

Finally, the literature review in Section 3 suggested that Germany since 1990 has adopted – if reluctantly so – an increasingly explicit stance towards democracy promotion with more and more ministries, agencies, instruments and resources being somehow geared to this aim.⁸¹ The content analysis provides some statistical evidence for such a gradual change in time, i.e., increasing references to the active promotion of democracy. When comparing the distribution of codes in the documents with the average distribution in US documents, the rhetoric of the Kohl government (coalition between Christian Democrats and Liberals, until 1998) clearly differs from the US profile, while correlations between the US average and the governments led by Gerhard Schröder (coalition between Social Democrats and Greens, 1998-2005) and Angela Merkel (coalition between Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, 2005-2009) are positive, significant and increase over time.⁸²

5. German democracy promotion in practice: A glimpse at three case studies

If the profile of German foreign policy – in general and with a particular view to democracy promotion – largely complies with the model of a Civilian Power, then the corresponding normative dispositions should shape German policies towards most different countries. Without claiming to really test this proposition, this section assesses its plausibility by briefly reviewing the results of three case studies on German democracy promotion policies: towards Bolivia, Turkey, and Russia.

In all three countries, German (and, in general, ‘North-Western’) democracy promotion policies recently had to deal with crucial challenges. In Bolivia, the 2005 election of Evo Morales as the first indigenous president of the country led to the dismantling of the democratic institutions that had been established in the 1980s and 1990s – and that were previously supported by Germany. The new constitution pushed by Morales, while still basically democratic, at least partially deviates from German conceptions of liberal democracy, the rule of law and market economy. The same holds true for the changes in economic policies (including ‘nationalisations’) promoted by President Morales which, in one case, directly hurt the interests of a German company.⁸³ In Turkey, it is the rise of political Islam that has challenged German policies. On the one hand, the political success of pro-Islamic parties in Turkey presented not only a direct threat to the Kemalist elite (and, therefore, the stability of the Turkish state), but was also perceived (in Germany) as a potential risk for the secular democratic order and for Turkey’s strategic orientation towards the West. On the other hand, it was the Justice and Development Party (AKP) which, since 2002, has promoted both political and economic reforms just along the lines demanded by the European Union (EU) and Germany.⁸⁴ With a view to Russia, Germany has vital interests in (economic) cooperation and in preventing domestic instability. Both interests clearly have been served by the political rise and leadership of Vladimir Putin since 1999. At the same time, Putin embarked on a path of gradual authoritarianization which led to increasing German concerns as to Russia’s political development – and, in particular, provoked increasing domestic criticism within Germany directed against the German government’s attitude towards Putin’s Russia.⁸⁵

The general pattern characterising German reactions to these most different processes of political change is one of pragmatic cooperation. In the Bolivian case, Germany largely supported the Morales government and its reform project, including by adjusting its democracy assistance. It basically accepted the democratically legitimated deviance from German preferences in terms of both the political regime and economic policies but, by

engaging the new government, tried to temper the political changes in order to prevent them from deviating too much from German conceptions of liberal democracy, human rights and market economy. At the same time, Germany tried to refrain from openly interfering in sensitive issues of domestic politics; privileged a conflict-sensitive approach of do no harm to a dogmatic emphasis on democratic and rule-of-law standards; and focused on supporting inclusive processes of dialogue and concertation.⁸⁶

In the case of Turkey, after some initial doubts as to threats to the secular order, the German government came to see the AKP government as a guarantor for democracy and stability as well as for an EU-oriented reform process. When reacting to domestic challenges to AKP rule,⁸⁷ Germany explicitly supported the democratically legitimated government. In fact, it was not so much Turkish domestic politics (e.g., the alleged threat of an Islamisation and authoritarianization pushed by the AKP) but changes in Turkish foreign policies (e.g., rapprochement with Iran and Syria and alienation from Israel) that met with German criticism. German development cooperation – including democracy assistance with a focus on the public sector – continued.⁸⁸

In the Russian case, continuity is the main feature characterising German policy. Given a strong German interest in ensuring continuing cooperation with Russia, normative concerns as to the political situation in Russia have had a limited impact on actual policies at best. Opposition parties have regularly joined the media and human rights groups in demanding a much less sympathetic German attitude towards Putin's Russia, but once in power they quickly chose pragmatic continuity. To the extent that the democracy issue is relevant at all, it is treated through dialogue. In terms of democracy assistance, the German political foundations are in part working with opposition groups, but in general focus on supporting political dialogue and long-term change.⁸⁹

This picture – general and underspecified as it is – largely confirms the notion of a Civilian Power Germany. However, such a 'cultural' narrative only tells one part of the story. As already mentioned above, the cultural or normative predispositions represented by the Civilian Power concept are, at the same time, quite in line with the 'classical' tangible interests the literature assumes to guide Germany's foreign policy. This argument – that the Civilian Power represents not so much a 'purely' ideational phenomenon but one in which interests and norms are articulated in particular ways – is clearly supported by the three case studies. In the Bolivian case, the 'civilian' way of promoting democracy was enabled by the almost complete absence of any tangible German interests.⁹⁰ The one (minor) case where a German company was affected by 'nationalisation' led to intense activities by the German

embassy and even Chancellor Merkel – Germany, in fact, suspended a development cooperation project.⁹¹ This suggests that the reaction to Morales probably would have been much less benign and tolerant in the case of a significant harm to German economic interests. Yet, even this clearly interest-driven support of a German company could be justified normatively in terms of Germany's approach to democracy promotion: According to the official German discourse, private property rights are a crucial element of the rule of law (the *Rechtsstaat*) and, as seen above, democracy and the rule of law are inextricably linked. Thus, the sanction *against* Bolivia in defence of German economic interests, at the same time, could be presented as support *for* 'democracy and the rule of law' in Bolivia.

In the case of Turkey, Germany's increasing scepticism as to Turkey's accession to the EU does not fit well with the alleged aim to promote Turkish democracy.⁹² For a Civilian Power, the 'socialisation' into international (democratic) norms via the EU accession process should be *the* privileged strategy – a strategy that is clearly undermined by the rejection of a potential accession by the Christian Democrats which have been heading the German government since 2005. While this position is clearly driven by partisan interests – especially in benefiting from Islamophobic and anti-Turkish sentiments in the German population –, it is mainly justified in normative terms: In line with the Civilian Power concept, Turkey is presented as not living up to the normative standards of the EU, and Turkey's accession is said to threaten the EU, i.e. the institution that is seen as the most important achievement in the process of civilising international relations. However, the fact remains that the culturalist argument put forward – i.e., that a Muslim, ultimately non-European Turkey was threatening the particular identity of the EU – is clearly not in line with the focus on universal norms and inclusionary participation that is assumed to guide a Civilian Power.

In the case of Russia, the inherent tension between the different normative guidelines for a Civilian Power come to the fore, namely the tension between the preference for cooperation and inclusion and a substantial 'value-orientation' in terms of democracy and human rights. That German governments – the party-political composition notwithstanding – obviously privilege the former can be read as supporting the argument that Germany represents rather a 'trading state' than a Civilian Power.⁹³ The growing distance between Russia's political reality and Germany's normative preferences, however, does pose continuing problems for the German government. The German stance towards Russia – even if mainly shaped by economic interests – has to be at least presented as normatively appropriate for a Civilian Power. In this sense, the German government has argued, for example, that more than open criticism it is dialogue based on mutual trust that serves democracy in Russia – with Russia's

democratic development seen as part of a comprehensive and long-term process of modernization.⁹⁴ In this sense, the political foundations represent an ideal instrument for Germany to (semi-officially) promote democracy – including NGOs and political parties that belong to the opposition – with a long-term perspective without threatening trustful relations between the two governments.⁹⁵

6. Conclusions

A cultural theory of democracy promotion traces the particular conceptions and practices of a given democracy promoter back to the political cultures of the individual country: ‘The more democracy promotion is seen as part of a liberal mission, the more coercive instruments will be applied; the more democracy is seen as something that has to grow from within society, the more low-key tools (if any) are preferred’.⁹⁶ Civilian Powers in general and Germany in particular clearly belong to the latter camp. Democracy promotion, here, is based on a rather abstract and broad notion of universal values and rights; conceives of democratization as a long-term, evolutionary process of complex transformation; privileges pragmatic strategies of (institutional) cooperation and inclusion; and is relatively reluctant to openly meddle in other states’ affairs and infringe on their rights to sovereignty and self-determination.⁹⁷ The present paper has developed these four features as part of a specific approach to democracy promotion that is in line with the general role conception of a Civilian Power. A review of the literature on German democracy promotion, a content analysis of German official documents and a brief comparison of German democracy promotion policies towards three different countries have shown that this Civilian Power approach to democracy promotion fits quite well the German case.

This, however, is not to say that such ‘cultural’ predispositions explain German democracy promotion. Both the conceptual debate and the empirical case studies suggest that ‘political culture’ – as specified in the Civilian Power approach to democracy promotion – is relevant for, but surely does not determine foreign policy. Its causal effects operate more in the sense of constituting norms of appropriateness that constrain and enable.⁹⁸ They constrain policy choices by requiring their justification in terms of certain normative guidelines. But in every single case, there is still a broad range of rather different interpretations and practices that can be seen or presented as in line with these guidelines. In addition, the range of potentially appropriate policies is further broadened by the fact that the normative guidelines are, at least partially, contradictory. In the case of democracy promotion, this refers particularly to the tension between a preference for cooperation, inclusion and non-interference (in the interest

of peace and in line with international sovereignty rights) and the explicit promotion of substantial values (in the interest of democracy and in line with international human rights norms). The same holds true, however, for tangible ‘material’ interests: Such interests have not only to be defined – and such definition depends on a particular ideational background. They themselves yield only a range of potentially appropriate policies: ‘Material’ interests constrain in the sense that some policy choices may be excluded because they clearly hurt those interests defined as vital, and they enable to the extent that different policies can be justified as serving them.

In the case of German foreign policy, a politically reluctant, cooperative and long-term approach to democracy promotion seems to best fit both the cultural predispositions and the material interests the German government is representing. In terms of actual democracy promotion policies, this can still result in quite different practices on the ground.

Endnotes

¹ V. M. Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis. Classic and Contemporary Theory* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); H. Müller and T. Risse-Kappen, ‘From the Outside In and from the Inside Out: International Relations, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy’, in D. Skidmore, V. M. Hudson (eds.), *The Limits of State Autonomy. Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), pp.25–48; S. Smith, A. Hadfield and T. Dunne (eds.), *Foreign Policy. Theories – Actors – Cases* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

² K.J. Holsti, ‘National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy’, *International Studies Quarterly* 14/3 (1970), pp.233–309; K. Kirste and H.W. Maull, ‘Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie’, *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 3/2 (1996), pp.283–312.

³ B. Joerissen and B. Stahl (eds.), *Europäische Außenpolitik und nationale Identität. Vergleichende Diskurs- und Verhaltensstudien zu Dänemark, Deutschland, Frankreich, Griechenland, Italien und den Niederlanden* (Münster: LIT, 2003); P.J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996).

⁴ J.S. Duffield, ‘Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism’, *International Organization* 53/4 (1999), 765–803; Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, pp.103–23.

⁵ H.W. Maull, ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’, *Foreign Affairs* 69/5 (1990), pp.91–106; S. Harnisch and H.W. Maull (eds.), *Germany as a Civilian Power? The foreign policy of the Berlin Republic* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001); Kirste and Maull, ‘Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie’; H. Tewes, *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe. Enlarging NATO and the European Union* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002).

⁶ S. Harnisch and H.W. Maull, ‘Introduction’, in Harnisch and Maull, *Germany as a Civilian Power?*, pp.3–4. See also Kirste and Maull, ‘Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie’, pp.300–1; Tewes, *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe*, pp.33–50.

⁷ See U. Becker, H. Müller and S. Wisotzki, ‘Democracy and Nuclear Arms Control – Destiny or Ambiguity?’ *Security Studies* 17/4 (2008), pp.810–54; Duffield, ‘Political Culture and State Behavior’; A. Geis, ‘Burdens of the Past, Shadows of the Future. The Use of Military Force as Challenge for the German “Civilian Power”’, in A. Geis, H. Müller and N. Schörnig (eds.), *The Janus Face of Liberal Democracies. Militant ‘Forces for Good’* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); A. Geis, H. Müller and N. Schörnig, ‘Liberale Demokratien und Krieg. Warum manche kämpfen und andere nicht’, *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 17/2 (2010), pp.171–202; P.J. Katzenstein (ed.), *Tamed Power. Germany in Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); P.J. Katzenstein, ‘Same War – Different Views: Germany, Japan and Counterterrorism’, *International Organization* 57/4 (2003), pp.731–60; T. Risse, ‘Kontinuität durch Wandel: Eine “neue” deutsche Außenpolitik?’, *APUZ* B11/2004, pp.24–31; V. Rittberger (ed.), *German foreign policy since unification. Theories and case studies* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001); Tewes, *Germany, Civilian Power*

and the New Europe; D. Webber (ed.), *New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy? German Foreign Policy Since Unification* (London: Frank Cass, 2001).

⁸ See A. Geis, 'Militär und Friedenspolitik – Dilemmata der deutschen "Zivilmacht"', in P. Schlotter, W. Nolte and R. Grasse (eds.), *Berliner Friedenspolitik? Militärische Transformation – Zivile Impulse – Europäische Einbindung* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), pp.60–82; Harnisch and Maull, *Germany as a Civilian Power?*; A. Leithner, *Shaping German Foreign Policy. History, Memory, and National Interest* (Boulder, CO: First Forum Press, 2009); Webber, *New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?*.

⁹ Harnisch and Maull, 'Introduction', p.2.

¹⁰ Risse, 'Kontinuität durch Wandel'. But see U. Roos, 'Deutsche Außenpolitik nach der Vereinigung. Zwischen ernüchtertem Idealismus und realpolitischem Weltordnungsstreben', *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 19/2 (2012), pp.7–40.

¹¹ H.W. Maull, 'Germany's foreign policy, post-Kosovo: still a "Civilian Power"?', in Harnisch and Maull, *Germany as a Civilian Power?*, pp.106–27. In a general sense (and with a view to different subtopics), this observation is confirmed by Harnisch and Maull (*Germany as a Civilian Power?*), most contributors to Webber (*New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?*), Geis ('Burdens of the Past, Shadows of the Future'), Katzenstein ('Same War – Different Views'), Leithner (*Shaping German Foreign Policy*), Risse ('Kontinuität durch Wandel'), and Tewes (*Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe*). Even Baumann and Hellmann – who emphasise Germany's new 'readiness to participate in military interventions' – conclude that their analysis 'should not be interpreted in the sense that Germany is shedding all its "civilian" traditions. What we are saying is rather that the German self-image of being a "civilian power" different from other more "traditional" Western powers is misleading. What is more, these "civilian" inclinations may lead to military interventions which more "hard-nosed" calculations of "national interests" would refuse.' R. Baumann and G. Hellmann, 'Germany and the Use of Military Force: "Total War", the "Culture of Restraint" and the Quest for Normality', in Webber, *New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?*, pp.61–82, p.79. With a view to recent debates concerning Germany's positioning in the 2011 intervention in Libya, see A. Miskimmon, 'German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis', *German Politics* 21/4 (2012), pp.392–410.

¹² See P. Burnell (ed.), *Democracy Assistance. International Co-operation for Democratization* (London: Frank Cass, 2000); P.J. Schraeder, 'The State of the Art in International Democracy Promotion: Results of a Joint European-North American Research Network', *Democratization* 20/2 (2003), 21–44; J. Wolff, H.-J. Spanger and H.-J. Puhle (eds.), *The Comparative International Politics of Democracy Promotion* (London: Routledge, forthcoming); R. Youngs, *International Democracy and the West. The Role of Governments, Civil Society, and Multinational Business* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

¹³ This last step draws on case studies conducted by Cemal Karakas (Turkey), Hans-Joachim Spanger (Russia) and myself (Bolivia) in the framework of a larger research project. The overall project included case studies on democracy promotion policies of two 'donors' (the US and Germany) vis-à-vis six 'recipient countries' (Belarus, Bolivia, Ecuador, Pakistan, Russia and Turkey). See Wolff et al., *The Comparative International Politics of Democracy Promotion*.

¹⁴ D. Azpuru, S.E. Finkel, A. Pérez-Liñán and M.A. Seligson, 'Trends in Democracy Assistance: What Has The United States Been Doing?', *Journal of Democracy* 19/2 (2008), pp.150–9, p.151.

¹⁵ Kirste and Maull, 'Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie', p.302.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp.300–1. See also Maull, 'Germany and Japan', pp.92–3; Harnisch and Maull ('Introduction', p. 4) mention the promotion 'of participatory forms of decision-making both within and between states (democratic participation)' as one of the 'six intertwined objectives' of a Civilian Power.

¹⁷ J. Wolff and I. Wurm, 'Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion: A proposal for theoretical classification', *Security Dialogue* 42/1 (2011), pp.77–96, p.81.

¹⁸ Tewes, *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe*, p.12.

¹⁹ See Kirste and Maull, 'Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie', pp.301–3; Harnisch and Maull, 'Introduction', pp.3–5.

²⁰ Kirste and Maull, 'Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie', pp.302.

²¹ F. Pfeil, 'Civil Power and human rights: the case of Germany', in Harnisch and Maull, *Germany as a Civilian Power?*, pp.88–105, p.88.

²² T. Carothers, 'Democracy Assistance: Political Vs. Developmental?', *Journal of Democracy* 20/1 (2009), 5–19, p.5.

²³ Kirste and Maull, 'Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie', pp.297–8. In his contribution, Carothers argues that the two approaches to democracy promotion cannot be simply read as representing the (political) US and the (developmental) European approach: There is just too much institutional heterogeneity on both sides of the Atlantic, and one can find elements of both approaches on either sides (Carothers, 'Democracy Assistance', pp.12–3). Yet, Carothers' brief comparison does point to a relative predominance of the political approach in US, and of the developmental approach in European democracy promotion policies (Carothers, 'Democracy Assistance', 14–8). See also Youngs, *International Democracy and the West*, pp.31–7. Another study finds more convergence than divergence of US and European approaches to democracy promotion: A. Magen, T. Risse and

M.A. McFaul (eds.), *Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law. American and European Strategies* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

²⁴ For a systematic development and operationalisation of this ideal-type conception of democracy promotion, see A.E. Poppe, B. Woitschach and J. Wolff, 'Freedom Fighter versus Civilian Power: an ideal-type comparison of US and German conceptions of democracy promotion', in J. Wolff, H.-J. Spanger and H.-J. Puhle (eds.), *The Comparative International Politics of Democracy Promotion* (London: Routledge, forthcoming).

²⁵ See J. Betz, 'Die Demokratieexportpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', in R. Hanisch (ed.), *Demokratieexport in die Länder des Südens?* (Hamburg: Deutsches Übersee-Institut, 1996), pp.203–30; Pfeil, 'Civil Power and human rights'; J. Rüland and N. Werz, 'Germany's Hesitant Role in Promoting Democracy', in P.J. Schraeder (ed.), *Exporting Democracy. Rhetoric vs. Reality* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp.73–89.

²⁶ M. Pinto-Duschinsky, 'Foreign political aid: the German political foundations and their US counterparts', *International Affairs* 67/1 (1991), pp.33–63; S. Mair, 'Germany's Stiftungen and Democracy Assistance: Comparative Advantages, New Challenges', in Burnell, *Democracy Assistance*, pp.128–49.

²⁷ Mair, 'Germany's Stiftungen', p.132.

²⁸ Pfeil, 'Civil Power and human rights', p.88.

²⁹ S.P. Huntington, *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late 20th Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

³⁰ Rüland and Werz, 'Germany's Hesitant Role', p.78.

³¹ See Betz, 'Die Demokratieexportpolitik', p.204; Pfeil, 'Civil Power and human rights', p.89; Rüland and Werz, 'Germany's Hesitant Role', p.78.

³² Rüland and Werz, 'Germany's Hesitant Role', p.81.

³³ G. Erdmann, *Demokratie und Demokratieförderung in der Dritten Welt. Ein Literaturbericht und eine Erhebung der Konzepte und Instrumente* (Bonn: Deutsche Kommission Justitia et Pax, 1996), p.139.

³⁴ Betz, 'Die Demokratieexportpolitik', p.204.

³⁵ See Betz, 'Die Demokratieexportpolitik', p.215; Rüland and Werz, 'Germany's Hesitant Role', p.86; M. Lerch, *Demokratie im Aufwind? Außenpolitische Strategien der Demokratieförderung* (Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2007), p.9; R. Youngs, *Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000-2006* (Madrid: FRIDE, 2006), pp.113–4. 'On the part of the [German] government, the importance of the rule of law and governance is emphasised; democracy in the sense of pushing for political competition guaranteed by state regulations is, in contrast, not mentioned at all.' J. Pospisil, *Die Entwicklung von Sicherheit. Entwicklungspolitische Programme der USA und Deutschlands im Grenzbereich zur Sicherheitspolitik* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2009), p. 248.

³⁶ Erdmann, *Demokratie und Demokratieförderung*, pp.134–6.

³⁷ Pfeil, 'Civil Power and human rights', pp.89–90. See also Youngs, *Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies*, p.111.

³⁸ This reluctance can be read as extending the logic of the 'culture of restraint' that had evolved in post-Second World War Germany 'in light of the disastrous consequences of German militarism during the Nazi period' (Baumann and Hellmann, 'Germany and the Use of Military Force', p.62). With a view to democracy promotion, it is reinforced by Germany's own experience with (the failure of) democracy and democratization.

³⁹ Betz, 'Die Demokratieexportpolitik', p.208.

⁴⁰ Lerch, *Demokratie im Aufwind?*, p.9; Rüland and Werz, 'Germany's Hesitant Role', p.86; Youngs, *Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies*, p.111.

⁴¹ Betz, 'Die Demokratieexportpolitik', p.208.

⁴² Betz, 'Die Demokratieexportpolitik', p.207. See also Rüland and Werz, 'Germany's Hesitant Role', p.73–6.

⁴³ W. Lapins, *Demokratieförderung in der Deutschen Außenpolitik* (Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2007), p.5.

⁴⁴ Rüland and Werz, 'Germany's Hesitant Role', p.80.

⁴⁵ Pfeil, 'Civil Power and human rights'. See also H. Boekle, 'German foreign human rights policy within the UN', in Rittberger, *German foreign policy since unification*, pp.271–95.

⁴⁶ Quoted in Lapins, *Demokratieförderung*, p.21.

⁴⁷ Rüland and Werz, 'Germany's Hesitant Role', p.84. See also Mair, 'Germany's Stiftungen'; Pinto-Duschinsky, 'Foreign political aid'.

⁴⁸ See Rüland and Werz, 'Germany's Hesitant Role'.

⁴⁹ See Betz, 'Die Demokratieexportpolitik', pp.205–8; Lerch, *Demokratie im Aufwind?*, p.11; Pfeil, 'Civil Power and human rights', pp.95–7; Rüland and Werz, 'Germany's Hesitant Role', p.73–4.

⁵⁰ The primary sources include speeches and documents from all German governments since 1990 (until 2009) and the four principal actors shaping foreign policy (Chancellery, Foreign Office, Defence Ministry, Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development). The original content analysis – and the research project it is part of – compared Germany and the US. Here, just the German part is presented, and references to the US are only made selectively in order to highlight the specific features of the German rhetoric on democracy promotion. See Poppe et al., 'Freedom Fighter versus Civilian Power'.

⁵¹ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg), *Weißbuch zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der Zukunft der Bundeswehr* (Berlin: BMVg, 1994), p.41; A. Merkel, 'Außenpolitische Grundsatzrede der Bundeskanzlerin in Abu Dhabi' (5 February 2007, Abu Dhabi).

⁵² Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ), *Förderung von Demokratie in der deutschen Entwicklungspolitik. Unterstützung politischer Reformprozesse und Beteiligung der Bevölkerung* (Bonn: BMZ, 2005).

⁵³ BMZ, *Entwicklungspolitik der Bundesregierung zur Förderung von Menschenrechten, Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit* (Bonn: BMZ, 1998); K. Kinkel, 'Rede anlässlich der 52. Sitzung der Menschenrechtskommission' (16 April 1996, Geneva); C.-D. Spranger, 'Rede beim Entwicklungspolitischen Forum der Deutschen Stiftung für internationale Entwicklung (DSE)' (19 January 1998, Berlin).

⁵⁴ BMZ, *Förderung von Demokratie*, p.6.

⁵⁵ BMZ, *Förderung von Demokratie*, p.5.

⁵⁶ BMVg, *Weißbuch* (1994), p.41.

⁵⁷ In contrast, the analysis of US documents found much more explicit references to the universality of democracy than to abstract universal rights and values.

⁵⁸ See Auswärtiges Amt (AA), 'Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen, Joschka Fischer, zur Eröffnung des Forums Zukunft der Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik' (4 July 2000, Berlin), p.5; BMZ, *Auf dem Weg in die Eine Welt – Weißbuch zur Entwicklungspolitik* (Bonn: BMZ, 2008), p.137; J. Fischer, 'Rede auf der 40. Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz' (7 February 2004, Munich); Kinkel, 'Rede anlässlich der 52. Sitzung der Menschenrechtskommission'; H. Wiecek-Zeul, 'A Year of Opportunities: UN Reform and Development Finance' (16 April 2005, Washington, DC). At times, the dimension of the rule of law even takes priority over democracy: Foreign Minister Steinmeier, for example, argued that Germany – because of its particular historical experience and in contrast to the US – prefers a process 'that leads from the establishment of the rule of law [*rechtsstaatliche Strukturen*] to democratization' (quoted in Lapins, *Demokratieförderung*, p.16).

⁵⁹ See AA, 'Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen', p.5; BMZ, *Förderung von Demokratie*, p.15; Kinkel, 'Rede anlässlich der 52. Sitzung der Menschenrechtskommission'; G. Schröder, 'Rede bei der 39. Kommandeurtagung der Bundeswehr' (8 April 2002, Hannover); Spranger, 'Rede beim Entwicklungspolitischen Forum'; Wiecek-Zeul 2005).

⁶⁰ In contrast, USAID's Democracy and Governance Strategic Framework systematically includes 'democratic breakthroughs' – 'dramatic openings for democratization' such as 'peaceful revolutions' – as crucial steps that make a 'democratic transition' possible. USAID, *At Freedom's Frontiers. A Democracy and Governance Strategic Framework* (Washington, DC: USAID, 2005), p.12.

⁶¹ BMZ, *Entwicklungspolitik der Bundesregierung*, p.28.

⁶² BMZ, *Förderung von Demokratie*, p.5. See also BMZ, *Auf dem Weg in die Eine Welt*, p.139; H. Wiecek-Zeul, 'Rede zum Thema "Entwicklung und Gerechtigkeit" beim Willy-Brandt-Zentrum für Deutschland- und Europastudien der Universität Wrocław/Breslau' (14 May 2003, Wrocław).

⁶³ T. Carothers, 'The End of the Transition Paradigm', *Journal of Democracy* 13/1 (2002), pp.5–21.

⁶⁴ BMZ, *Förderung von Demokratie*, pp.11–2. The paper does mention 'transition countries' (*Übergangsländer*) but emphasises that these regularly 'remain stuck in transitional structures' (*ibid.*, pp.21–22, 8). The transition (from authoritarian rule and/or towards democracy) as a particular, rather short-term process of political change is not mentioned at all.

⁶⁵ The relative frequencies of the categories 'characterization as enemy' and 'exclusion' are 11.2% (US) vs. 3.85% (Germany) and 9.05% (US) vs. 3.3% (Germany).

⁶⁶ See BMVg, *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien für den Geschäftsbereich des Bundesministers der Verteidigung* (Berlin: BMVg, 2003), p.20; BMVg, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr* (Berlin: BMVg, 2006), p.16; Schröder, 'Rede bei der 39. Kommandeurtagung der Bundeswehr'. The relative frequencies of the two categories are 3.3% (exclusion) and 2.2% (inclusion). If references to terrorism are taken out, 'inclusion' (2.2%) outweighs 'exclusion' (1.65%). A notable exception includes the following remarks by Development Minister Wiecek-Zeul who called for telling 'those that still oppress their people, disregard freedom and human rights, and only pursue their own advancement, like Mugabe in Zimbabwe': 'You will fall too; your people will gain freedom too. We work for the pursuit of this aim.' Bundesregierung, 'Regierungserklärung der Bundesministerin für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, Heidmarie Wiecek-Zeul' (29 January 2009, Berlin), p.8.

⁶⁷ Katzenstein, 'Same War – Different Views'.

⁶⁸ See Spranger, 'Rede beim Entwicklungspolitischen Forum'.

⁶⁹ BMZ, *Entwicklungspolitik der Bundesregierung*, pp.29–30.

⁷⁰ BMZ, *Förderung von Demokratie*, pp.18–9.

⁷¹ BMZ, *Förderung von Demokratie*, p.19. See also BMZ, *Auf dem Weg in die Eine Welt*, p.139.

⁷² BMZ, *Förderung von Demokratie*, p.10.

⁷³ For the same amount (20) of documents, in the US case 478 democracy-promotion-related text passages were coded, as compared to 109 in the German case.

⁷⁴ Because US documents, on the average, contain more words, frequencies are reported as percentages of total words. The shares are 0.3% (USA) vs. 0.1% (Germany) for 'freedom/liberty' (*Freiheit*), 0.44% vs. 0.24% for 'democracy' (*Demokratie*), and 0.07% vs. 0.06% for 'rule of law' (*Rechtsstaat*).

⁷⁵ See BMVg, *Weißbuch* (1994), p.41; BMZ, *Förderung von Demokratie*, pp.5–6; Merkel, 'Außenpolitische Grundsatzrede'; F. Steinmeier, 'Rede bei der Eröffnung der Deutschlandforschertagung der Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung' (9 November 2008, Berlin).

⁷⁶ See BMZ, *Förderung von Demokratie*, p.6; Kinkel, 'Rede anlässlich der 52. Sitzung der Menschenrechtskommission'.

⁷⁷ BMVg, *Weißbuch* (1994), p.41.

⁷⁸ BMZ, *Förderung von Demokratie*, p.6.

⁷⁹ BMZ, *Förderung von Demokratie*, p.17.

⁸⁰ BMZ, *Förderung von Demokratie*, pp.18–9.

⁸¹ According to Richard Youngs, the German development ministry's funding for Democracy, Civil Society, and Public Administration has 'increased from €180 million (6.2 percent of bilateral ODA) in 2000 to €410 million (9 percent) in 2006'. R. Youngs, 'Trends in Democracy Assistance: What Has Europe Been Doing?', *Journal of Democracy* 19/2 (2008), pp.160–9, p.161.

⁸² The coefficient of correlation (Pearson's *r*) with the US average is not significant with $r=0.28$ for the German subgroup 'Kohl', but highly significant ($p<.001$) for the subgroups 'Schröder' ($r=0.58$) and 'Merkel' ($r=0.64$).

⁸³ See J. Wolff, 'Democracy promotion, empowerment, and self-determination: conflicting objectives in US and German policies towards Bolivia', *Democratization* 19/3 (2012), pp.415–37; J. Wolff, 'Democracy promotion in Bolivia: the "democratic revolution" of Evo Morales', in Wolff et al., *The Comparative International Politics of Democracy Promotion*.

⁸⁴ See C. Karakas, 'Democracy promotion in Turkey: the rise of political Islam', in Wolff et al., *The Comparative International Politics of Democracy Promotion*.

⁸⁵ See H.-J. Spanger, 'Democracy promotion in Russia: the ambivalent challenge posed by Putinism', in Wolff et al. *The Comparative International Politics of Democracy Promotion*.

⁸⁶ Wolff, 'Democracy promotion in Bolivia'.

⁸⁷ These challenges included a threat of a coup in 2007 and an attempt to ban the AKP party in 2008.

⁸⁸ Karakas, 'Democracy promotion in Turkey'.

⁸⁹ Spanger, 'Democracy promotion in Russia'.

⁹⁰ In fact, the most important tangible (if particular) interests involved concerned the organizational self-interests of the different agencies implementing official German development aid (e.g., GTZ or the political foundations). These interests – i.e., to continue their work in the country and continue receiving corresponding public funding – were perfectly in line with the cooperative alignment to the Morales government as pursued by the German government.

⁹¹ Wolff, 'Democracy promotion in Bolivia'.

⁹² Karakas, 'Democracy promotion in Turkey'.

⁹³ The notion of a trading state draws, of course, on R.N. Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1986).

⁹⁴ An additional argument concerns Germany's special 'historical responsibility' towards Russia. Germany, therefore, has a particular responsibility to help Russia and to do so with a maximum respect for Russia's sovereignty and self-determination.

⁹⁵ Spanger, 'Democracy promotion in Russia'.

⁹⁶ Wolff and Wurm, 'Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion', p.89.

⁹⁷ These conceptual (or cultural) patterns of German foreign policy (discourse) have been confirmed also by a comparative content analysis of pre-war parliamentary debates in Western democracies since 1990. Whereas in the US discourse, the frequency of references to 'power', 'enemy images' and 'democracy' is above average, the German debate is characterised, in particular, by arguments pointing to 'values', 'international law' and 'peaceful means exhausted'. Geis et al., 'Liberaler Demokratien und Krieg', pp.190, 193. See also Geis, 'Burdens of the Past, Shadows of the Future'.

⁹⁸ See S. Harnisch and H.W. Maull, 'Conclusion: "Learned its lesson well?" Germany as a Civilian Power ten years after unification', in Harnisch and Maull, *Germany as a Civilian Power?*, pp.128–56, p.128–9; H. Müller, 'Vorüberlegungen zu einer Theorie der Ambivalenz liberal-demokratischer Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik', in A. Geis, H. Müller and W. Wagner (eds.), *Schattenseiten des Demokratischen Friedens. Zur Kritik einer Theorie liberaler Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2007), pp.287–312, p.206; Hudson, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, p. 121.